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Working Paper 1: 
Current Approaches to Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration (DDR) Programme Design and Implementation 
 
Guy Lamb 
1. Introduction 
 
The success of programmes that relate to disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration (DDR) of former combatants into civilian life is dependent on four 
crucial aspects. First, it is essential that there is insightful and comprehensive planning 
that is based on sound research and analysis in order for a realistic strategy to be 
developed. Second, it is critical that the requisite political will exist at all levels to 
implement this strategy efficiently and effectively. Third, these programmes are 
typically expensive and time-consuming processes, and hence the necessary 
resources, namely financial and material support, and technical expertise, need to be 
secured. Fourth, it is vital that effective monitoring and evaluation systems are 
included in DDR processes, and that these systems are an integral part of the 
implementation strategy. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine critically current DDR developments, as well 
as explore the possible next steps for DDR. This will include the consideration of the 
current state of DDR and the extent to which initiatives such as the Multi-Country 
Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), the United Nations Integrated 
DDR Standards (IDDRS) and the Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR), as well as 
other contemporary policy instruments and programmes encompass a human security 
perspective and reflects the interests of the poor.  The key question that this paper will 
explore is: to what extent does current or “third generation” DDR programming differ 
from those DDR initiatives of the 1980s and 1990s (or “second generation”)1; and to 
what extent do they contribute to the sustainable alleviation of poverty? 
 
Thus, the intention of this paper is to interrogate current international thinking and 
practice on DDR, and it seeks to determine whether DDR programmers and 
operational personnel are “learning the lessons” from previous DDR processes. This 
paper draws upon a literature review, current policy documents, official reports and 
communications, independent evaluations, and some primary field research on 
contemporary DDR processes, namely in Central Africa, West Africa, Sudan, Nepal 
and East Timor. It primarily focuses on the demobilisation and reintegration aspects 
of DDR. 
                                                 
1 First generation DDR were those post- World War I and World War II processes that were oriented 
towards the demobilisation and reintegration into civilian life of soldiers from those major armed 
conflicts. 
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The structure of this paper is divided into the following sections: an outline of 
definitions and concepts used in the paper; an overview of the evolution of the DDR 
concept and DDR programming; an assessment of the MDRP; an examination of the 
SIDDR and its impact; an appraisal of the IDDRS and its implementation; and 
concluding remarks and recommendations. 
 
Table 1: Definitions and concepts 
 
Demobilisation 
Demobilisation is a planned process by which the number of personnel under arms 
and in military command structures is significantly reduced. It includes the reduction 
in size of the regular military, paramilitary forces, as well as rebel groups (sometimes 
after their integration into new regular armed forces). In practice, demobilisation 
usually involves the assembly, disarmament, administration, counselling, skills 
assessment and then the discharge of former combatants, with a compensation package 
and/or assistance programme in place. 
 
Resettlement/Reinsertion 
Resettlement or reinsertion is the process that follows demobilisation, whereby former 
combatants are transported and settled in the areas and communities of their 
preference. In a number of resettlement processes, former combatants have been 
provided with money and/or other resources to assist them with this process either by 
national governments or donor agencies. 
 
Reintegration 
Reintegration is a complex economic, political, social and psychological process by 
which former soldiers make the transition from a military life to a civilian life. 
Reintegration is generally a long-term process, as it may take several years for ex-
soldiers and their families to adapt to a civilian way of life. Hence a distinction is 
often made between economic, political, social and psychological reintegration.  
 
Traditionally the following have been provided by governments and/or donor 
agencies as resettlement and/or reintegration support: cash payments, foodstuffs (or 
coupons), healthcare, clothing, housing, furniture and housing equipment and building 
material, seeds or agricultural equipment, agricultural extension services, scholarships 
and school fees for children, counselling and vocational guidance, legal and business 
advice, job placement or apprenticeships, general referral services, access to land, 
public works and public sector job creation, wage subsidies, credit schemes, and 
technical training. 
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 2. The Evolution of DDR Programming and the DDR Concept 
2.1 An historical overview of DDR programming  
Programmes that target the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of 
former combatants are not recent phenomena. DDR programmes took place in many 
countries after World War I and World War II, and there are examples of some level 
of policy development to deal with large numbers of ex-combatants after many 
historical conflicts. For example, after the Second Anglo-Boer War in South Africa 
(1902) a number of DDR programmes were pursued. Historical evidence even 
suggests that crude DDR programmes were implemented during the period of the 
Roman Empire. 2  From the early 1980s, however, DDR began to develop into a 
specialist field, especially with the conclusion of armed conflicts in Zimbabwe, 
Ethiopia/Eritrea, Uganda and Namibia. 
 
Over the past three decades, DDR programmes have had mixed results. Some have 
been innovative and remarkably successful, as was the case in Ethiopia, Eritrea and 
Uganda. Others have been glaringly ineffective, with the result that many ex-
combatants have been unable to secure employment, and/or make the necessary social 
and psychological adjustments to make the successful transition to civilian life. As a 
result, these individuals have become marginalised members of their societies, and 
live in conditions of abject poverty. There are a number of studies to support this 
assertion.3 
 
From the 1980s, the World Bank was the dominant programming force behind most 
DDR processes (which have predominantly been undertaken in Africa). However, 
from the early-1990s other international agencies, such as the UN (particularly the 
UNDP), donor governments and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) became 
more actively involved in DDR initiatives.  
 
                                                 
2 Brent D. Shaw. 1984. “Bandits in the Roman Empire”,  Past and Present, No. 105, November, pp. 3-
52. 
3  See: World Bank. 1993. Demobilisation and Reintegration of Military Personnel in Africa: the 
Evidence from Seven Country Case Studies (World Bank: Washington D.C.); Colletta, N. J. et al, 
1996. The Transition From War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa, (Washington D.C.: The World Bank); 
Don Foster, Paul Haupt and Marésa de Beer. 2005. The Theatre of Violence: Narratives of 
Protagonists in the South African Conflict. Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, p. 15-
16; Centre for Conflict Resolution. 2003. The Reintegration into Civilian life of Demobilised Umkhonto 
we Sizwe and Azanian People’s Liberation Army Ex-Combatants. Unpublished report, Cape Town, p. 
22; Sasha Gear. 2002. “Wishing us Away: Challenges Facing Ex-Combatants in the New South 
Africa,” Violence and Transition Series, Vol. 8; “Reaping the Whirlwind: The Demobilisation and 
Reintegration of Former Combatants in Zimbabwe, 1979-2004”, In David Everatt (ed.). Only Useful 
Until Democracy? Reintegrating Ex-Combatants in Post-Apartheid South Africa with Lessons from 
Kosovo and Zimbabwe. Johannesburg: Atlantic Philanthropies; Jakkie Cilliers, J. (ed.), 1995. 
Dismissed: Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Africa. Halfway House, South 
Africa: The Institute for Defence Policy. 
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It was only in the 1990s that considerable financial resources and intellectual capital 
began to be devoted to DDR related issues. For example, in 1991, the U.S. and Italy 
provided significant amounts of funding for the Ethiopian demobilisation process. 
The EU, Cuba and the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) 
financed the Namibian DDR process (1989).4  The Sierra Leone DDR process (1997-
2002), which disarmed, demobilised and reintegrated some 72,500 combatants into 
civilian life, was funded from a Multi-Donor Trust Fund of US$31.5 million.5  
 
Since 2000 there has been a discernable trend among DDR programmers towards 
multi-country coordinated approaches, particularly where the conflict in question had 
a multi-national dimension. Previous country-level initiatives had not always 
appreciated the regional dimensions of conflict. The US$500 million Multi-Country 
Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), which addresses DDR issues in 
countries in the Great Lakes region/Central Africa, is the most notable example of this 
trend, and is examined in some detail below. The MDRP is also notable for its 
attempts to disaggregate DDR programmes in order to provide specialised support to 
specific groups, such as female ex-combatants, former child soldiers the disabled, and 
combatants on foreign soil.  
 
Table 1 below provides a listing and basic details of DDR programmes that were in 
existence during the first quarter of 2007. It reveals that the vast majority of recent 
DDR programmes have been taking place in Africa (16 out of 22). In addition, 
compared to the non-African programmes, DDR programmers and programme staff 
in Africa are required to support substantially larger numbers and more diverse sets of 
beneficiaries. The implications of this are that more sophistication in the design of 
DDR programmes has been required in Africa. 
 
Of the total programmes, three were in the early stages of being established, seven 
were in the demobilisation phase, 10 were in the process of implementing 
reintegration processes, while one had ended, and another had been disrupted. 
Table 2: Current DDR programmes (as at March 2007)  
Country Combatants Composition Demobilised 
(%) 
Situation 
Afghanistan 63,380 Militias 62,000 (98.4) Ended 
Angola 138,000 105,000 militias 
&  
33,000 armed 
forces 
97,115 (70) Demobilisation 
Burundi 78,000 41,000 armed 
forces, 21,500 
21,769 (39)6 Demobilisation 
                                                 
4 World Bank. 1993. Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel in Africa: The Evidence 
from Seven Country Case Studies (Washington, D.C.: World Bank). 
5 World Bank. 2002. “Sierra Leone: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration,” Findings: Good 
Practice Info Brief, No. 81, October. 
6 The demobilisation of the national armed forces is not taken into account in this figure. 
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militias & 15,500 
guerrillas 
Cambodia 30,000 Armed forces 40,000 (133) Demobilisation7
Central African 
Republic 
7,565 Militias 7,565 (100) Reintegration 
Chad 9,000 Armed forces 9,000 Reintegration 
Colombia 
(AUC) 
30,000 Paramilitaries 31,761 (105.9) Reintegration 
Côte d’Ivoire 45,000 41,000 Militias & 
4,000 armed 
forces 
981 (2) Interrupted 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo 
150,000 112,000 militias 
& 
38,000 armed 
forces8
102,331 (68) Demobilisation 
Eritrea 200,000 Armed forces 200,000 Reintegration 
Filipinas 
(Mindanao) 
25,000 Guerrillas - Reintegration 
Guinea-Bissau 12,595 10,544 armed 
forces & 2,051 
militias 
11,445 (90.8) Reintegration 
Haiti 6,0009 Militias 128 (2.1) Prospecting 
Indonesia 
(GAM)  
5,000 Guerrillas 6,145 (123) Reintegration 
Liberia 119,000 12,000 armed 
forces, 91,000 
guerrillas & 
16,000 militias 
101,495 (85.3) Reintegration 
Nepal 12,00010 Guerrillas - Cantonment 
Niger 3,160 Militias 3,160 Reintegration 
Rep. Congo 30,000 Militias 17,400 (58) Demobilisation 
Rwanda 45,000 30,000 militias &  
15,000 armed 
forces 
26,436 (58.5) Demobilisation 
Somalia 53,000 Militias 1,266 (2.3) Pilot stage 
Sudan11 178,500 121,000 armed 
forces, 40,500 
guerrillas & 
17,000 vulnerable 
groups 
21,500 (12) Demobilisation 
Uganda 15,310 Guerrillas 16,133 (105) Reintegration 
TOTAL (22) 1,255,510 741,466 OAG & 783,049 (61.7)  
                                                 
7 The process interrupted between 2003 and 2005 due to a lack of funds. 
8 Some 23,000 were foreign troops from Burundi (4,000), Republic of Congo (4,000) and Rwanda 
(15,000). 
9 This figure is an estimate. 
10 This figure is an estimate. 
11 This figure is an estimate. 
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513,544 armed 
forces 
Source: Escola de pau. 200812 
2.2 The generation of knowledge on DDR 
Prior to 2000, publications on DDR processes were generally technical in nature, 
country specific, and did not actively consider the connections between DDR and 
debates about human development, human security and poverty alleviation. Only a 
small group of researchers and demilitarisation specialists plied their trade in this 
sector. The institutions that specialised in DDR included, amongst others: the World 
Bank, the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC),13 the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), the International Labour Office (ILO), 14  the 
Institute for Defence Policy (now the Institute for Security Studies---ISS), and the 
Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR). 
 
Since 2000 the generation of knowledge about DDR related issues and the investment 
of resources in the design and implementation of DDR programmes has increased 
exponentially. DDR appears to have become an industry. Numerous research 
institutes, university departments and militaries are currently specialising in DDR. 
Research projects that interrogate the links between DDR and transitional justice, 
post-conflict armed crime, migration and poverty (to name a few) are currently being 
pursued. Consulting groups that specialise in designing and assessing DDR processes 
have emerged, and both government agencies and tertiary institutions are offering 
practical DDR courses.  
 
Internationally, momentum has been building to develop guidelines and standards on 
DDR processes. The Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR) (2005) brought together 
DDR specialists, both governmental and non-governmental, in a year-long process 
that was designed to challenge some existing practices, and recommend new 
approaches and policies that would contribute to more effective and holistic DDR 
implementation. A new initiative by a UN Inter-Agency Working Group  produced 
the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS), 
in 2006, as a guide for implementation of DDR processes. In 2007 the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) published a handbook on 
security sector reform, which includes sections on DDR and post-conflict 
peacebuilding.15 
                                                 
12 Escola de pau. 2008.  Analysis of the DDR programs existing in the world during 2006,  p. 18, at 
http://www.pangea.org/unescopau/img/programas/desarme/ddr004i.pdf. 
13 The annual BICC Conversion Survey, which was first published in 1996, was one of the first 
initiatives that sought to track international DDR trends.  
14 The ILO compiled some of the earliest guidelines and manuals for skills training for demobilised 
soldiers. 
15 OECD. 2007. OECD DAC Handbook on Security Sector Reform (SSR): Supporting Security and 
Justice. Paris: OECD. It is important to note that SIDDR, IDDRS and the OECD handbook are not the 
first such initiatives in this regard. For example, both the International Labour Office (ILO) and the 
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These new initiatives were matched on the ground with new programming models, of 
which the most notable and ambitious was the Multi-Country Demobilization and 
Reintegration Program, covering nine conflict affected states in sub-Saharan Africa.  
3. Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program 
(MDRP) 
3.1 Overview of the MDRP 
In August 1998, a loose collection of rebel groups supported by the governments of 
Rwanda and Uganda launched a military campaign to oust Laurent Kabila, the 
President of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) from office. This was a 
position that Kabila had only acquired a year earlier when he had led a rebellion with 
Rwandan financial and military support that resulted in the toppling of the 
kleptocratic regime of Mobuto Sese Seko. Kabila’s demise was forestalled with the 
arrival of Angolan, Namibian and Zimbabwean troops who were able to repulse the 
rebel advance on Kinshasa.  
 
In July 1999 a ceasefire agreement, which included a significant (DDR) component, 
was consented to by all countries to the conflict. The ceasefire agreement stipulated 
that all foreign troops must withdraw from DRC territory by February 2000. 
However, following delays in the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, as well 
as the assassination of Laurent Kabila in January 2001, the majority of foreign 
soldiers were only withdrawn by late 2001. 
 
The MDRP was launched in April 2002 by the World Bank and the UN, in 
consultation with other donor governments and agencies. Its geographical focus is the 
greater Great Lakes region of Central Africa, and it was established to “support the 
consolidation of peace and stability in the region through a comprehensive framework 
for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration.”16 The specific countries that are 
part of the MDRP are: Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), the 
DRC, the Republic of Congo (ROC), Rwanda and Uganda. 17  As Namibia and 
Zimbabwe also participated in the DRC armed conflict (in support of the Kabila 
                                                                                                                                            
collaboration between German Technical Co-operation, Norwegian Defence International Centre, 
Pearson Peacekeeping Centre and the Swedish National Defence College have developed DDR training 
manuals and handbooks. See ILO. 1997. Manual on Training and Employment Options for Ex-
combatants. Geneva: ILO; and Gleichmann, Colin, Michael Odenwald, Kees Steenken and Adrian 
Wilkinson. 2004. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: A Practical Field and Classroom 
Guide. Frankfurt: German Technical Co-operation, Norwegian Defence International Centre, Pearson 
Peacekeeping Centre and the Swedish National Defence College. 
16 World Bank. 2001. “Partners Consult on Greater Great Lakes Demobilization and Reintegration 
Program and Trust Fund”, Press Release No: 2002/165/AFR, 19 December. 
17 MDRP. 2007. MDRP Fact Sheet (March 2007) (http://www.mdrp.org). 
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government), it is envisaged that support will be provided to these two countries 
should the need arise.18  
 
In 2008 the MDRP is providing support to national programmes in Angola, Burundi, 
the DRC, the ROC and Rwanda. Programmes in the CAR and Uganda were originally 
part of the MDRP process, but were concluded during 2007. The Angolan and 
Rwandan programmes are close to completion. The Burundi and DRC programmes 
have made significant progress in terms of demobilisation and reinsertion, and are in 
the early stages of reintegration support. The ROC programme has only recently been 
initiated.19 
 
The MDRP reflects a significant departure from the conventional approach to 
programming in terms of the demobilisation and reintegration (D&R) into civilian life 
of former combatants. Prior to this programme, D&R processes were typically 
designed and implemented at the national level. In the case of DRC, however, a 
number of countries and rebel groups from neighbouring countries to the DRC were 
directly involved, and so a regional approach was advocated.  The mid-term review of 
the MDRP described the programme as “a radical innovation… a bold and 
experimental effort, one that is unprecedented in the post-conflict field.”20 
 
The MDRP has become one of the largest D&R programmes in scope and range 
currently in existence, seeking  to co-ordinate and provide assistance to almost half a 
million ex-combatants in the abovementioned seven countries. The key mandate of 
the MDRP is to support and/or supervise national governments in the greater Great 
Lakes region that are seeking to devise and implement D&R programmes. The main 
functions of the MDRP are to: contribute to the establishment of standard approaches, 
coordinate DDR projects, and provide financial and technical assistance in the 
demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration of ex-combatants in the seven countries 
in the programme.21 
 
The World Bank and 11 donor governments provide funding for the MDRP. The 
World Bank contributes approximately US$200 million, while the governments of 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
the United Kingdom and the European Commission provide close to US$300 million 
(of which US$200 million is currently committed). Funding for the disarmament 
                                                 
18 MDRP. ND. Partnering for Peace in Africa: Breaking the Conflict Cycle in the Greater Great Lakes 
Region (MDRP at a Glance), pp. 3-7 (http://www.mdrp.org). 
19 MDRP. 2007. MDRP Fact Sheet (March 2007) at http://www.mdrp.org. 
20 Development Alternatives, Inc. 2005. A Partnership in Need of Reaffirmation: Midterm Review of 
the Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program  (MDRP), (Bethesda: Development 
Alternatives), p. 2. 
21 MDRP. ND. Partnering for Peace in Africa: Breaking the Conflict Cycle in the Greater Great Lakes 
Region (MDRP at a Glance), p. 3  at http://www.mdrp.org. 
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component of the DDR process is derived from other sources.22 The MDRP estimates 
that it finances “95% of DDR programmes in the region”.23 
 
In terms of national programmes, the MDRP does not take a ‘one-size-fits-all’ within 
the countries it operates, but rather the nature of the armed conflict, national 
characteristics and dynamics, as well as the specific socioeconomic profiles of ex-
combatants are taken into account when designing the programme. Typically, a 
national programme comprises the following elements: demobilisation; reinsertion; 
reintegration; support to special groups; and implementation arrangements.  
 
In addition to national projects, the MDRP also supports special projects, which are 
generally smaller in scale. Usually they are designed to address specific, urgent issues 
while a national program is in the process of being devised, such as the repatriation of 
ex-combatants to their country of origin, or to provide assistance in parts of a country 
that are outside of government control. The latter is the case in eastern DRC where 
emergency community-based reintegration activities are needed for groups that are 
not signatories of the Lusaka Agreement, particularly child soldiers. In 2007 10 
MDRP Special Projects were under implementation, and two had been completed.24 
 
The MDRP reports that it undertakes and supports projects that are regional in nature 
and/or address crosscutting issues, such as gender and combatants on foreign soil 
(COFS). In terms of gender, the MDRP targets female ex-combatants as they have 
often been subject to gender-specific abuse. In addition, they may have experienced 
certain social freedoms during conflict, only to be subject to social repression on their 
return to more restrictive traditional female roles. Similarly, young male ex-
combatants may be stigmatized and excluded if they are unable to find employment or 
access land, thereby making them vulnerable to future mobilization.25 
 
It is estimated that there are between 25,000 and 45,000 combatants on foreign soil 
(COFS) in the greater Great Lakes region. The MDRP actively seeks to facilitate the 
return of COFS to their country of origin.26 For example, the MDRP estimates that 
there are six distinct foreign armed groups operating from the DRC (mainly in North 
and South Kivu), with the most problematic being the Forces Démocratiques de 
Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) (formerly referred to as the Interahamwe militia), 
                                                 
22 MDRP. ND. Partnering for Peace in Africa: Breaking the Conflict Cycle in the Greater Great Lakes 
Region (MDRP at a Glance), p. 4 at http://www.mdrp.org. 
23 MDRP. 2007. MDRP Joint Partner Mission Report: Country Report for the DRC. New York: 
MDRP, p. 5. 
24 MDRP. ND. Partnering for Peace in Africa: Breaking the Conflict Cycle in the Greater Great Lakes 
Region (MDRP at a Glance), p. 11 at http://www.mdrp.org. 
25 Ibid., p. 11. 
26  MDRP. 2006. Report of Proceedings: Advisory and Trust Fund Committee Meetings, Paris, 
November 20th-22nd, (Washington, D.C.: MDRP), p. 7; MDRP. 2002. “Situation Update: Focus on 
DRC and Rwanda”, Planning and Management Task Force Meeting on the DRC, United Nations 
Headquarters, 23 October. 
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which “continues to directly affect the stabilisation of peace and security” in the 
DRC.27 
 
The MDRP also claims that it facilitates the regional sharing of technical knowledge 
and other related information, capacity building approaches and joint analysis among 
participating national programs through semi-annual meetings of the regional 
Technical Coordination Group. Database harmonization for national programmes and 
special projects has taken place, to limit the possibility that ex-combatants will cross 
borders and illegally benefit from multiple D&R operations. The MDRP also 
undertakes research to enhance the knowledge and understanding among its staff of 
DDR issues.28 
3.2 Analysis of the MDRP and country programmes 
In terms of the projected lifespan of the MDRP, the programme passed the halfway 
mark in February 2006. At this point in time, 295,134 former combatants had been 
demobilised, and 242,150 and 180,207 had been, or were in the process of being, 
assisted through reinsertion and reintegration support processes respectively. In 
comparison, by the end of October 2007, the number of beneficiaries of MDRP 
processes had almost doubled in number: 412,875 former combatants had been 
demobilised; and 318,991 and 391,227 had received or were in the process of 
receiving reinsertion and reintegration support respectively. In addition, of the 
US$485 million that had been committed by donor agencies by mid-2007, 74% had 
already been disbursed (see table 3 below). 
Table 3: MDRP performance: Supporting beneficiaries 
      Number of beneficiaries    
Country  Actual: 
31.1.06 
Target:
31.1.06 
% of 
target 
Actual: 
30.10.07 
Target: 
30.10.07 
% of 
target 
Angola Demobilisation 97,115 138,000 70 97,390 138,000 71
Reinsertion 51,287 62,716 81 53,607 62,716 85
Reintegration29 62,210 166,662 37 72,164 166,662 43
Burundi Demobilisation 22,011 55,000 40 23,185 55,000 42
Reinsertion 18,996 55,000 34 20,144 47,000 43
Reintegration 5,412 55,000 10 13,029 47,000 28
CAR30 Demobilisation 7,556 7,565 100 7,556 7,565 100
Reinsertion 7,533 7,565 100 7,533 7,565 100
Reintegration 7,556 7,565 100 7,556 7,565 100
DRC Demobilisation 116,939 150,000 78 124,059 150,000 83
Reinsertion 101,250 120,000 84 102,013 120,000 85
Reintegration 45,593 90,000 50 47,043 90,000 52
                                                 
27 MDRP. 2007. MDRP Joint Partner Mission Report: Country Report for the DRC. New York: 
MDRP, p. 114. 
28 MDRP. 2007. “Regional Projects”, at http://www.mdrp.org. 
29 Refers to the receiving of reintegration assistance only. 
30 Project closed on 28 February 2007. 
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ROC Demobilisation 0 11,000 0 0 11,000 0
Reinsertion 0 11,000 0 5,059 19,000 27
Reintegration 0 30,000 0 0 30,000 0
Rwanda Demobilisation 26,462 36,000 73 26,668 36,000 74
Reinsertion 38,772 47,400 82 38,978 47,400 82
Reintegration 40,068 50,000 77 40,415 50,000 81
Uganda31 Demobilisation 16,193 15,310 105 16,256 15,310 106
Reinsertion 14,527 15,310 95 14,816 15,310 97
Reintegration 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Demobilisation 286,276 412,875 69 295,134 412,875 71
Reinsertion 232,365 318,991 72 242,150 318,991 74
Reintegration 160,839 399,227 39 180,207 391,227 45
(Source: MDRP)32 
 
Table 4: MDRP trust fund: Commitments and disbursements by country (as at 
30 June 2007) 
Programmes/projects Committed amount 
(US$) 
Disbursed (US$) % disbursed
Angola 89,182,952 41,838,524 57 
Burundi 79,133,058 41,521,205 52 
Central African Republic 9,777,777 9,727,000 99 
Congo, Republic of 17,000,000 2,508,650 15 
Democratic Republic of Congo 241,956,152 224,341,092 93 
Rwanda 44,207,701 35,318,029 93 
Uganda 4,204,000 4,161,749 99 
Total 485,460,863 359,415,250 74 
Source: MDRP. 2007. Monthly Statistical Progress Report September 2007, p. 3. 
 
The number of beneficiaries and funds disbursed has been used by the MDRP to 
measure its successes and failures, particularly with respect to reinsertion and 
reintegration. As table 2 indicates, MDRP has been relatively successful in facilitating 
demobilisation (71% of targeted beneficiaries) and providing reinsertion support 
(74% of targeted beneficiaries). In terms of total reintegration, considerable action on 
the part of the MDRP is still required, as only 45% of the aggregate beneficiary target 
had been achieved by October 2007.  
 
In the DRC 85% and 52% of reinsertion and reintegration support has been disbursed 
respectively. This national programme has however been encountering difficulties in 
the North and South Kivu provinces due to a number of factors: the recent resurgence 
in violence; the non-compliance of some military groups and senior military 
personalities with the official D&R process; the establishment of militia groups; and 
                                                 
31 Project closed 30 June 2007. 
32 MDRP. 2007. Quarterly Progress Report, April-June 2007, at http://www.mdrp.org, p. 4. 
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the inability of the national armed forces to establish order in the eastern DRC.33 
Nonetheless, the DRC programme has been relatively successful in providing support 
to 29,000 children who had been associated with armed forces. This support included 
family tracing, reunification assistance and reintegration support.34 
 
In Rwanda, by October 2007, more than 80% of reinsertion and reintegration support 
had been disbursed. This programme has pursued a more holistic approach to 
reintegration than many other national programmes. For example, the 
partners/spouses of former combatants have been included in some training 
programmes.35 However, the effectiveness of this programme has been undermined 
by the instability in the eastern DRC and the activities of rebel groups in that area.36 
The funding for the project has been extended until December 2008, but the MDRP 
Secretariat has sought ways to develop an exit strategy for Rwanda, which would 
improve the prospects for sustainability of the D&R process after the phasing out of 
the MDRP presence.37 
 
Both the CAR and Ugandan programmes met their proclaimed targets, and were 
subsequently phased out during 2007. However, these programmes were not without 
their implementation lessons and challenges. In CAR, in particular, there were serious 
difficulties in the disarmament stage, with only 190 of the 7,565 beneficiaries 
disarmed, completely negating the ‘one man, one gun’ principle of the programme. 
There were also serious doubts about the eligibility of many of the participants: there 
was a notable urban bias in the distribution of reinsertion support (85% of 
beneficiaries resided in Bangui, the capital). The distribution of reinsertion kits was 
often delayed, and the spouses of ex-combatants were excluded from the reinsertion 
process (in contradiction to the design of the programme).38  
 
The lack of meaningful national ownership of the MDRP process in CAR led to 
tension between government officials and the in-country staff of the MDRP, working 
in the Project for the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants and Community Assistance - 
PRAC. According to the former staff of the now disbanded national government’s 
Commission Nationale de Désamement, Démobilisation et Réintegration (CNDDR), 
the composition of PRAC (which was staffed by expatriates), and the manner in 
which activities were designed and implemented, contributed to friction between the 
two bodies. CNDDR former staff indicated that: PRAC staff had received higher 
salaries than those of CNDDR officials; PRAC had implemented un-budgeted 
                                                 
33 MDRP. 2007. MDRP Joint Partner Mission Report. New York: MDRP, p. 4. 
34  MDRP. 2007. MDRP Fact Sheet: Democratic Republic of Congo, October 2007, 
at http://www.mdrp.org. 
35 MDRP. 2006. Quarterly Progress Report, October-December 2006, at http://www.mdrp.org, pp. 5-
7. 
36 MDRP. 2007. MDRP Fact Sheet: Rwanda, October 2007, at http://www.mdrp.org. 
37  MDRP. 2007. MDRP Joint Partner Mission Report: Country Report for Rwanda. New York: 
MDRP, p. 164. 
38 MDRP. 2007. MDRP Joint Partner Mission Report: Country Report for Central African Republic. 
New York: MDRP, pp. 98-99. 
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activities; and the DDR eligibility criteria applied by PRAC had not taken the 
dynamics of the CAR conflict into account. 39  According to the MDRP: “Weak 
communication between stakeholders involved in the PRAC resulted in a number of 
misunderstandings and a lack of confidence and trust at all levels of the 
programme”.40 
 
In Uganda, there was a very different context for DDR: MDRP support targeted the 
Amnesty Commission, which was established to support those former rebels and 
associated individuals that had renounced and had withdrawn from the armed 
rebellion against the Ugandan government, and had applied for amnesty. Since the 
conflict with the LRA continued after the initiation of DDR actvities, there was no 
possibility of reaching all potential beneficiaries. In addition, the MDRP Secretariat 
has expressed concern that the current weak capacity of the Amnesty Commission 
may undermine the effectiveness of follow on activities.41 The MDRP presence in 
Uganda appears to have provided an important source of funds to enable the Amnesty 
Commission to make progress towards clearing the backlog of amnesty cases.42 The 
MDRP Secretariat has continued to collaborate with the national government (and 
other relevant organisations) to make arrangements for the DR&R components of the 
Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda.43 
 
In Angola, the MDRP programme only began after the conflict had ended and some 
disarmament and  demobilisation programmes had been initiated. The MDRP 
involvement has supported a national programme to demobilize up to 138,000 ex-
combatants and provide reintegration support to almost 167,000 ex-combatants.  Eight 
sub-projects have been implemented that specifically target disabled ex-combatants.44 
As of December 2007, some 8,000 of those receiving reintegration support had been 
interviewed, of which 62% indicated that they were self-employed, 4% formally 
employed, 34% unemployed, and 97% have access to agricultural land.45  
 
The Burundi programme has made measurable progress in the provision of 
demobilisation and reintegration support, particularly with respect to children 
associated with fighting forces. By October 2007, some 3,041 children had been 
demobilised, and had received reintegration support.46  However, DR&R progress has 
                                                 
39 Nelson Alusala. 2008. Emerging Human Security Issues in the Implementation of the MDRP Fund in 
the Central African Republic (CAR). Project Mini-Case Study: Institute for Security Studies 
(ISS)/CICS, at www.ddr-humansecurity.org.uk. 
40 MDRP. 2007. MDRP Joint Partner Mission Report: Country Report for Central African Republic. 
New York: MDRP, p. 102. 
41 MDRP. 2007. MDRP Joint Partner Mission Report: Country Report for Uganda. New York: 
MDRP, p. 176. 
42 See Leah Finnegan, Catherine Flew. 2007. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in 
Uganda. Project Mini Case-Study: Saferworld/CICS, at www.ddr-humansecurity.org.uk. 
43 MDRP. 2007. MDRP Fact Sheet: Uganda, October 2007, at www.mdrp.org. 
44 MDRP. 2006. Quarterly Progress Report, October-December 2006,  at www.mdrp.org, pp. 4-7. 
45 MDRP. 2007. MDRP Fact Sheet: Angola, February 2008, at http://www.mdrp.org. 
46 MDRP. 2007. MDRP Fact Sheet: Burundi, October 2007, at http://www.mdrp.org. 
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been frustrated by the incomplete implementation of the peace agreement between the 
Burundian government and the Forces Nationales Pour la Libération – Palipehutu 
(FNL-Palipehutu), due to political and security dynamics between the two groups.47 
In addition, the DR&R process has been constrained by weak financial institutions, 
and a lack of national government and civil society institutional/technical capacity, 
which has contributed to delays and problems with respect to the effective delivery of 
reinsertion and reintegration support.48 
 
In October 2007, the MDRP officially commenced the provision of reintegration 
support to some 5,059 self-demobilised beneficiaries in the ROC. 49  However, 
stakeholders outside of the MDRP process expressed concern that implementing a 
reintegration process more than four years after the end of the armed conflict could 
result in negative and counter-productive dynamics. Instead, many analysts claim that 
resources should be directly channelled to projects that would benefit the community 
without privileging ex-combatants. Others claim that a DDR programme only serves 
to remind Congolese society of the war, and disrupts people’s coping mechanisms.50 
4. Linking DDR with Poverty Alleviation and Promoting Human 
Security 
 
In order to determine the extent to which those DDR processes that were designed and 
implemented by the MDRP have either contributed to, or undermined, poverty 
alleviation and human security in the Great Lakes region, the following three 
questions should be addressed: 
 
• Did the MDRP process contribute to more effective national government 
capacity to design, manage and implement DDR programmes independently? 
• Were the beneficiaries of DDR support able to secure sustainable employment 
and/or livelihoods after receiving reintegration support?  
• Were the beneficiaries of DDR support actually able to integrate socially into 
the communities into which they were settled?  
 
4.1 National ownership 
According to the MDRP, “national ownership of DDR programme development and 
implementation” is one of its key principles, and has been “applied consistently in all 
national programmes supported by the MDRP, with the arguable exception of the 
                                                 
47  MDRP. 2007. MDRP Joint Partner Mission Report: Country Report for Burundi. New York: 
MDRP, pp. 5-8. 
48 Field research undertaken in Burundi by Henri Boshoff (Military Analyst, ISS), October 2007. 
49 MDRP. 2007.  MDRP Fact Sheet: Republic of Congo, October 2007, at www.mdrp.org. 
50 See Nelson Alusala and Guy Lamb. 2008. Emerging Human Security Issues in the Planned 
Implementation of MDRP Fund in the Republic of Congo (RoC). ISS/CICS, DDR and Human Security 
Project  Mini Case-Study, at www.ddr-humansecurity.org.uk. 
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CAR” 51  Despite this sentiment, comprehensive approaches or models that are 
oriented towards building sustainable D&R capacity and ownership within national 
governments appear not to have been given sufficient attention during the design of 
MDRP. This was probably due to the  transitional or fragile nature of many of the 
Central African governments in which MDRP processes were established, as well as 
the urgent need for DDR programmes to be implemented in those countries. 
 
As some MDRP processes have approached completion, there has been more 
attention paid to issues of national ownership and sustainability. For example, the 
World Bank is in the process of creating a “single-country Multi-Donor Trust Fund” 
to support ongoing and anticipated DDR processes in Uganda.52 In addition, during 
an MDRP seminar in Paris in mid-December 2007, presentations by two MDRP 
Secretariat staff members on DDR project exit strategies in Sierra Leone and Ethiopia 
indicated that the MDRP Secretariat was contemplating the manner in which national 
ownership of the DDR process should be promoted in those countries that the MDRP 
is seeking to exit.53 
4.2 Sustainable economic and social reintegration 
In terms of ascertaining the impact and effectiveness of its various projects and 
activities, the MDRP appears to over-emphasise the quantification (as opposed to the 
assessment of quality) of its programming and activities. That is, the MDRP primarily 
evaluates itself in terms of targets that relate to the number of beneficiaries supported 
and funds disbursed (as detailed in tables 2 and 3 above). A primary focus on the 
quality of DDR interventions, which should include an assessment of the 
sustainability of economic and social reintegration programming, will provide a 
clearer indication of the impact of DDR interventions on poverty alleviation and 
human security. 
 
Qualitative reflections are however not entirely absent within the MDRP community, 
as there here has been some consideration of the long-term effectiveness of 
beneficiary support. There is an acknowledgement within the MDRP Secretariat and 
partner organisations that the quality of programme implementation and support is 
dependent on the political will of the national governments in question, technical 
capabilities, staff capacity, the effectiveness of monitoring and evaluation, and the 
nature of the support and supervision of the MDRP Secretariat. In this regard, the 
World Bank conducts monitoring and evaluation exercises in order to rate the 
“implementation quality” of the MDRP projects and initiatives.54  
 
                                                 
51 MDRP. 2007. MDRP Joint Partner Mission Report. New York: MDRP, pp. 6. 
52 Ibid., pp. 6-7. It is anticipated that the work of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund will be used to support 
the ongoing work of the Amnesty Commission, and possibly DDR in relation to the Lord’s Resistance 
Army (Ugandan rebel group). 
53 Presentations by Ingo Wiederhofer and Sean Bradley, MDRP Seminar, Paris, 13 December 2007. 
54 MDRP. 2007. MDRP Joint Partner Mission Report. New York: MDRP, pp. 9-10. 
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The MDRP has also commissioned a number of studies on the consequences and 
impact of reinsertion and reintegration in a select number of MDRP-supported 
countries. However, it is not clear if the results of these studies will have a significant 
impact on the manner in which the MDRP evaluates the impact of its various projects 
and activities. For example, in one of the working papers it is acknowledged that: 
“there is an important link between reintegration assistance to ex-combatants and 
wider community development”.55 The paper concludes by stating that one of the key 
principles of successful reintegration programmes is that assistance should only be 
offered where it “leads to sustainable livelihoods for ex-combatants”.56  However, 
these types of conclusions have yet to be fully embedded  in programme design and 
operations.  
 
In general, there appears to be a growing acknowledgement among MDRP staff of the 
key linkages between DDR and broader sustainable development issues, but as yet 
this has not been translated into real changes in policy on the ground. During the 
MDRP Technical Co-ordination Group meetings in Paris in November 2006, a 
discussion took place on the relationships between DDR, poverty, conflict, and 
development issues. Despite this discussion, there appears to have been no 
recommendations to link the work of the MDRP with the broader dynamics of 
conflict, poverty and development in the future.57 
4.3 MDRP: recommendations for future programming 
Despite the challenges and difficulties of promoting sustainable national ownership of 
DDR processes, and a limited appreciation for the qualitative dimensions of 
reintegration programming, the MDRP has arguably contributed to poverty alleviation 
and human security in the Great Lakes region. The financial contributions and 
specialised projects provided by the MDRP have no doubt improved the standard of 
living and personal security of the approximately 400,000 beneficiaries in the short- 
to medium-term. However, the long-term implications of this support at this point in 
time are unknown. 
 
Hence, the MDRP and programmers in future DDR processes should consider taking 
the following broad recommendations into account: 
 
• Approaches which aim to build capacity in national DDR structures and 
processes should be debated and formulated in the planning stage (rather than 
in the exit phase) of the DDR intervention. Such approaches/models should be 
determined in a consultative and transparent manner, and should be used as a 
performance indicator for the DDR intervention. 
                                                 
55Sarah Michael. 2006. “Reintegration Assistance for Ex-Combatants: Good Practices and Lessons for 
the MDRP”, Working Paper No.1, September. Washington, D.C.: MDRP, p.2. 
56 Ibid. p.34 
57  MDRP. 2006. Report of Proceedings: Advisory and Trust Fund Committee Meetings, Paris, 
November 20th-22nd. Washington, D.C.: MDRP, p. 31. 
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• Consideration of the long-term sustainability of DDR interventions, 
particularly the reintegration component, should be a central focus of DDR 
programming, as well as the manner in which these programmes are 
evaluated. 
 
• There should be a critical reflection on whether conventional DDR 
interventions are appropriate for contexts where several years have passed 
since the end of the armed conflict. In such contexts, a DDR programme may 
contribute to domestic tension and conflict.  
 
Should the MDRP community decide to amend its DDR interventions so that it 
pursues a more rigorous approach to human security and development, as well as 
poverty alleviation in the Great Lakes region, it is highly probable (as indicated by 
independent evaluators) that it will encounter institutional obstacles. The programme 
appears to have become overly bureaucratic and inflexible, and resistant to change. 
Inter-group tensions, rivalries and stumbling blocks have emerged. For example, the 
published mid-term review of the programme, claimed that “Institutional 
philosophies, agendas and interests have often clashed…relations between MDRP 
partners seem often acrimonious, characterized by mutual recrimination, and devoid 
of common vision”58 
 
The same review highlighted other bureaucratic and structural obstacles, including 
poor prioritization of projects and programming initiatives, weak or delayed field 
coordination; and limited involvement of local civil society actors and 
organizations. 59  One of the report’s key recommendations was that the MDRP 
leadership should “…make time to demonstrate creative leadership in DDR thinking 
(links to security, targeting and reintegration issues, special groups such as women 
associated with armed groups, the role of civil society, links to community 
development efforts, etc)”.60 
5. Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation 
Reintegration (SIDDR) 
 
The increasing importance of DDR in post-conflict peacebuilding programmes, the 
growing attention to programmes such as the MDRP, and the continued need for new 
DDR programmes in other post-conflict environments, prompted increasing research 
and evaluation of existing experiences, and a search for new guidelines and best 
                                                 
58 Development Alternatives, Inc. 2005. A Partnership in Need of Reaffirmation: Midterm Review of 
the Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program  (MDRP). Bethesda: Development 
Alternatives, p. iii. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid., p. 31 
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practice approaches for the international community. One of the key initiatives in this 
process was the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration 
(SIDDR), launched in Stockholm, in November 2004, with representatives attending 
from 23 countries and 14 national and international organisations, institutes and UN 
agencies. This was followed up with further meetings, until a final conference was 
held in Stockholm in November 2005.61 
5.1 Overview of SIDDR 
Although the SIDDR was launched as a mechanism to review DDR practice and 
challenge existing assumptions, in reality, the Final Report of the SIDDR largely 
reinforces conventional approaches to DDR, rather than advancing new, creative and 
unorthodox programming. Despite this, the report identifies key lessons and 
knowledge generated, albeit rather generalist, from past DDR programmes and 
experiences. 
SIDDR primarily promoted DDR as a political process, where DDR was seen to have 
the potential to significantly contribute to state transition, stabilisation and recovery. 
According to the SIDDR Final Report, DDR should ideally facilitate the creation of 
an environment that is characterised by sufficient security, as well as minimum basic 
conditions for long-term peaceful development. Human security concerns seemed to 
be of secondary consideration, although debates about human security did feature in 
the deliberations over the SIDDR, particularly in the working group sessions. Much of 
the SIDDR agenda focused on strengthening DDR capacities and responses and 
drawing attention to mainstream DDR during integrated peace missions. 
Further, SIDDR recognised the importance of linking DDR to peace agreements and 
peace missions. This included stipulating the relevance of DDR in peace agreements 
and agreements on future national defence forces, as well as clear indications on how 
the parties should design and implement DDR processes. Further, it stressed the 
political nature of DDR during peace processes and recommended that DDR issues be 
added to the political work of peace missions. For example, it recommended that an 
international advisory team of independent DDR experts should be established to 
assist in peace negotiations, and suggested that this team could play a confidence-
building role in relation to parties to the conflict.62 
One of the key elements of the SIDDR is the promotion of national ownership of 
DDR processes. In the SIDDR Final Report it is recommended that national 
leadership and institutions should have the leading role and political responsibility for 
the DDR of ex-combatants, even when internationally or regionally mandated peace 
                                                 
61 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden. 2005. Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation 
Reintegration: Final Report. Stockholm: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden, pp. 10-12. 
62 Ibid, p. 22. 
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missions or international institutions are driving the organisation, supervision and 
monitoring of the DDR process.63 
SIDDR also emphasised local community engagement in DDR, a key factor in 
meeting human security needs during DDR. It suggested that there should be more 
transparency for local communities in decision-making, resource availability and 
information sharing in DDR processes and that there should be broad consultation 
processes for building national ownership and leadership in the DDR process. SIDDR 
also endorsed the idea of establishing funds that would assist communities with 
support for receiving ex-combatants, to complement DDR programmes. It was 
assumed that this would not only address the frequent accusation that DDR 
programmes tend to singly reward those combatants who took up arms, but it would 
also contribute to meeting the needs of communities and individuals affected by the 
conflict. It would also boost community confidence in DDR programmes.64 
In terms of social reintegration, an area where DDR has often been weak, SIDDR 
stressed the expediency of linking DDR with transitional justice and reconciliation 
mechanisms, arguing that post-conflict recovery is unlikely to progress without 
effective justice and reconciliation interventions.65 
5.2 Key SIDDR recommendations 
As part of the SIDDR Final Report, a series of generic and broad (non-geographic 
specific) recommendations were formulated to advance DDR policy and 
programming. Some of the recommendations are as follows:  
• DDR programmes in the contexts of peace processes should be designed in 
such a manner that they contribute to future sustainable long-term 
development. 
• DDR programmes should gear reintegration towards improving security in the 
short-term, but this should not undermine the longer-term objectives of 
sustainable peace and development. 
• Reintegration should be disaggregated into sequential components: reinsertion 
(transitional reintegration) assistance directly following demobilisation; and 
sustainable reintegration assistance in the medium to longer-term. 
• Reinsertion programmes should be designed to provide either a cash and/or in-
kind safety net, or ‘first step’ programmes such as labour intensive public 
works for clean-up and reconstruction, with the purpose of ensuring stability 
while the ground is prepared for more sustainable reintegration programmes. 
                                                 
63 Ibid, p. 22. 
64 Ibid., pp. 23-32. 
65 Ibid., pp. 31-32. 
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• Security-focused DDR processes should target ex-combatants for support. 
Donors should try to provide matching funds for parallel programmes for the 
benefit of receiving communities and other special war-affected groups. 
• Gender-sensitive DDR programmes, including gender-differentiated 
programmes targeting women, should be implemented. Similarly, the needs of 
women and children associated with conflict, who may not qualify for DDR 
programmes, need to be addressed through parallel programmes. 
• DDR programmes may benefit from efforts to stimulate the local private 
business sector and civil society, such as the reduction of barriers to doing 
business, access to credit, technology and technical support. 
• The private sector and civil society should be encouraged through appropriate 
policy and programming incentives to support local capacity building in 
parallel with support to economic and social reintegration efforts. 
• DDR programmes should be designed and implemented in relation to 
transitional justice measures in order to reconstitute civic trust and smooth the 
process of social reintegration. 
• Reintegration programmes should be inclusive and participatory, and include 
transparency and accountability mechanisms, as well as promoting inclusive 
democratic governance through consultation. 
5.3 Impact of SIDDR 
The impact of the SIDDR on DDR programming is impossible to determine, as the 
Final Report was overshadowed in a very short space of time by the publication of the 
IDDRS and the OEDC-DAC Handbook on Security Sector Reform. The SIDDR does 
not appear to have been the key reference source for the majority of DDR processes 
researched by this project, the implication being that ultimately, the SIDDR process 
may historically be regarded as one of the multitude of events on the DDR conference 
circuit rather than a key step in reforming DDR processes. However there was 
adherence to a number of the fundamentals of SIDDR in many countries: 
 
• Community development projects were incorporated into DDR programming 
in countries such as CAR, East Timor, Liberia and the Republic of Congo; 
• The needs of women and children associated with armed conflict were 
prioritised in many of the MDRP processes;  
• DDR programming was linked to peace processes and/or post-conflict 
peacebuilding in countries such Burundi, Nepal, Sudan and Uganda; 
• Transitional justice and DDR processes were linked in Uganda (Amnesty 
Commission); 
• Private sector businesses were involved with DDR, although on a small scale, 
in countries such as Liberia and the DRC; and 
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• Specialised and parallel projects for specific target groups have been 
implemented in a number of MDRP processes. 
 
In addition, the SIDDR process did bring together key intellectuals, policy-makers 
and practitioners in the DDR field, and succeeded in conceptually mainstreaming 
DDR within post-conflict peacebuilding debates. Such a meeting of minds would also 
undoubtedly have provided informal opportunities to brainstorm, network and discuss 
the strengths and weakness of conventional approaches to DDR programming.  
6. The UN Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) 
 
While the conclusions of  SIDDR were rather broad, a parallel exercise conducted by 
the UN, known as IDDRS, was developing much more specific policy 
recommendations, including detailed guidelines to DDR implementation globally.  
6.1 Overview 
The primary aim of the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration 
Standards (IDDRS) was to promote greater coordination and integration of UN DDR 
programming. 66  This was a response to the fact that DDR programmes have 
historically tended to be carried out in a disjointed, non-integrated way due to poor 
coordination, poor planning and support, and sometimes competition among different 
departments, agencies, funds and programmes. 
 
The IDDRS was developed by the UN Inter-Agency Working Group on 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (IAWG–DDR), which includes 
various UN departments, agencies, programmes and funds, as well as the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM). Following two years of workshop discussions and 
extensive consultations with DDR practitioners from the UN, member states, NGOs 
and the World Bank, the IDDRS were approved in July 2006.67 
 
The IDDRS were designed to provide direction and guidance to those engaged in 
preparing, implementing and supporting DDR programmes.  
They are a comprehensive compilation of knowledge, lessons identified and 
established practice on a wide range of issues relating to DDR concepts, policies and 
strategies, programme planning, design, management, and monitoring and evaluation. 
They also offer detailed guidance on key issues, such as information dissemination 
                                                 
66 UN Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (IAWG–
DDR). 2006. “Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards”. New York: 
United Nations, 1.10, pp. 1-5. The IDDRS handbook is divided into comprehensive and accessible 
modules, which can be removed from the handbook in the event that that user only requires to be 
informed about specific programming aspects of DDR. The handbook is also available online, and no 
fee is charged for downloading it. 
67 Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
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and sensitization, food aid and food security, women and gender, children, youths, 
health, and HIV/AIDS.68  
6.2 Fundamental principles of IDDRS 
According to IDDRS, five overarching principles should guide the UN approach to 
DDR. Programmes should be “people-centred”,  “flexible, accountable and 
transparent”, “nationally owned”, “integrated”, and “well planned”. The IDDRS 
recommends that non-discrimination and fair and equitable treatment of participants 
and beneficiaries should be the core principles of DDR programming, especially in 
the establishment of eligibility criteria for beneficiaries of DDR processes.  
 
In particular, the following should be included: 
! 
• Mechanisms to identify and include eligible women in DDR programmes; 
• Measures to ensure the unconditional release of children associated with 
armed conflict, and protection of children; 
• Reintegration benefits and opportunities geared to the specific needs of the 
relevant groups; 
• Reintegration benefits that include the families and spouses of ex-combatants; 
• Consultation and participation of beneficiaries in the planning and design of 
DDR processes. 69 
 
IDDRS, like SIDDR and the MDRP approach, recognises that the primary 
responsibility for DDR programmes should rest with national stakeholders. It 
recommends that the UN play a neutral role in supporting DDR processes. National 
ownership is, however, broader than exclusive central government ownership. 
Genuine national ownership requires the participation of a wide range of state and 
non-state actors at the national, regional and local levels, including civil society 
organizations. However, where national capacity is weak, the UN should work to 
systematically develop and strengthen it. Further, DDR practitioners should ensure 
that key national actors become genuine partners in DDR.70 
 
Where DDR programmes are linked with peacekeeping, post-conflict peacebuilding 
and development processes (which involve a variety of national and international 
military, police and civilian actors and institutions), the IDDRS recommends that an 
integrated approach be adopted. This reduces the likelihood of duplication, 
miscommunication, the establishment of conflicting programmes and the wastage of 
resources. 
                                                 
68 Ibid., 1.10, pp. 3-5. 
69 Ibid., 2.10, pp. 8-15. 
70 Ibid, 3.30, pp. 1-28. 
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6.3 Linking DDR to security, humanitarian and peacebuilding programmes 
Traditionally, DDR was seen as a relatively separate, ‘stand-alone’ exercise, largely 
unconnected conceptually or institutionally to broader projects of development, arms 
control or security sector reform. The IDDRS formalised a growing sense that DDR 
should be much more closely coordinated, if not integrated with, a wide range of 
related programming initiatives. As a result, an integrated DDR programme would be 
likely to generate a new integrated architecture, which would bring UN agencies and 
departments together.  
 
The IDDRS recommend that DDR processes be linked to relevant security, 
humanitarian, peacebuilding and recovery programmes, and security-related 
interventions, particularly during the planning stage of such DDR processes. 
Examples include: mine action, arms control and disarmament (SALW), and security 
sector reform (SSR).  The failure of previous DDR initiatives to lead onto or 
incorporate elements of SSR had been widely seen as a problem, often leading to 
renewed tensions or conflict, with an unreformed military or police force repeating 
the mistakes of the past.  
 
Similarly, the  proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) has the 
potential to undermine DDR efforts, as SALW provide those parties that did not 
enthusiastically endorse the peace agreement with the means to reignite the armed 
conflict. This was the case with the União National para a Independência Total de 
Angola (UNITA) in Angola in the early-1990s following the signing of a peace 
agreement (Bicesse Accords).71 The immediate post-conflict environment provides an 
opportunity to control the supply of, and demand for, small arms and light weapons, 
but effective integration or coordination of SALW and DDR programmes poses some 
challenges.  
6.4 Phasing issues during DDR and human security implications 
 
6.4.1  Disarmament72 
The IDDRS recognise that national governments have the right and responsibility to 
apply their own national standards to disarmament operations within their territory, 
but should comply with international and regional arms control conventions, 
standards and best practices. The IDDRS stipulates that, where appropriate, the 
principles of ‘proportional and fair disarmament’ and consultation with key 
stakeholders should be applied. In addition, DDR programmes should also avoid 
attaching monetary value to weapons as a means of encouraging their surrender, as 
this may actually contribute the proliferation of arms. 
 
                                                 
71 Human Rights Watch. 1994. Angola: Arms Trade and the Violations of the Laws of War Since the 
1992 Elections. New York: Human Rights Watch, pp. 12-18. 
72 IAWG–DDR, 2006, 4.10, pp. 1-26. 
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6.4.2  Demobilisation73 
According to the IDDRS, the timing, sequencing and implementation of 
demobilisation processes should be realistic (given the operational context) and 
strictly adhered to in order to build the confidence of participants and beneficiaries in 
the process. In addition, demobilisation should not be initiated until pre-agreed 
conditions of readiness have been achieved. IDDRS recognises that the human 
security of vulnerable groups is critical to sustainable peace and development, and 
hence the IDDRS recommends that the specific needs of those women, youth, 
children, the disabled and the chronically ill who participated in combat and/or were 
associated with armed forces and groups, should be taken into account.  
 
The IDDRS recommends that reinsertion assistance should preferably not involve 
large lump-sum cash payments. However, if money is to be provided to beneficiaries, 
it should be paid in small instalments, and linked to employment or services 
performed by the ex-combatant for the benefit of the community. Mobile 
demobilisation is seen to be more cost effective, expedient and flexible than 
cantonment approaches. 
 
6.4.3  Social/Economic reintegration74 
In order to enhance the potential success of social and economic reintegration, IDDRS 
emphasises the need for social cohesion between ex-combatants, their families and 
relevant community members. In this regard, reintegration processes should be 
designed to stabilise both the socio-economic environment of ex-combatants, as well 
as benefit the community into which ex-combatants reintegrate. DDR can also support 
community reconciliation through focused peacebuilding and reconciliation activities. 
Reintegration programmes should be planned and designed through a participatory 
process that involves ex-combatants and communities (particularly women), local and 
national authorities, and non-governmental actors in planning and decision-making. In 
addition, DDR programmes should also be co-ordinated with efforts to strengthen and 
reform both the justice and the security sectors. 
 
6.5.Gender and DDR75 
One area that many traditional DDR programmes had largely ignored was that of 
gender. In all armed conflicts, women have faced particular problems that have not 
normally been addressed by traditional DDR processes.  There have been numerous 
cases where females have been exposed to sexual and gender-based violence. In 
contexts of armed conflict, notions of masculinity are often linked to the possession 
and use of weapons, as well as violent actions towards women. The gender-specific 
role of men in post-conflict situations has also gained more attention. In some cases, 
                                                 
73 Ibid., 4.20, pp. 1-33. 
74 Ibid., 4.30, pp. 1-43. 
75Ibid., 5.10, pp. 1-40. 
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male ex-combatants are unable to fulfil the role as the breadwinner of the household 
following the end of the armed conflict. This may result in increased levels of 
frustration, which can lead to an increase in incidences of domestic violence and/or 
alcohol/drug abuse among male ex-combatants. Consequently, the IDDRS advocates 
that DDR programmes include appropriate counselling mechanisms and flexible, 
gender specific socioeconomic support. 
 
Women and girls usually shoulder the burden of caring for family members and 
others, and are therefore less able than men to take advantage of training, employment 
and other income-generating opportunities that are provided in DDR processes. 
Consequently, the IDDRS recommends that socio-economic reintegration 
programmes should be targeted towards: 
 
• Providing physical and psychosocial rehabilitation to disabled and chronically 
ill ex-combatants so that they do not become a burden for women and girls. 
• Taking into account specific gender dynamics related to access to land and 
housing, particularly when traditional practices and legal systems do not 
accommodate female-headed households or women’s land ownership. 
• Assessing the extent to which the production of crops and animal husbandry 
are divided among household members according to gender and age. 
• Preventing the marginalisation of women ex-combatants, supporters and 
dependents, and war widows, and providing them with assistance. 
• Supporting the transformation of violent masculine identities into non-violent 
ones through information, sensitization and counselling. 
• Allocating resources to train female ex-combatants, supporters, dependents 
and community members on how to care for and cope with children 
traumatized by conflict. 
 
6.6. Vulnerable groups 
In addition to addressing the situation of women in DDR programming, the IDDRS 
made considerable progress in addressing the need of ex-combatants who have 
particular needs and vulnerabilities and in targeting groups outside the immediate 
beneficiary group of ex-combatants.  
 
A good example is the new emphasis in the programme recommendations in IDDRS 
emphasis on the special needs of youth.76 DDR programmes have often been designed 
and implemented in environments where the majority of former combatants were 
youths, an age group defined by the UN as those between 15 and 24 years of age. 
Their vulnerability to violence, disease and other illnesses, and their exclusion from 
decision-making processes and structures has the potential to make reintegration a 
challenging process. For example, in conflict-affected environments, youth, and 
                                                 
76 Ibid., 5.20, pp. 1-39. 
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young men in particular, respond to authority in a negative manner, and are often 
attracted to sub-cultures that encourage violence as a means of social expression by 
appealing to their sense of ‘manhood’. Hence, according to the IDDRS, DDR 
programmes should take account of the special needs of youth. 
 
The socio-economic reintegration of young ex-combatants depends largely on their 
ability to engage in economically productive activities following the end of the armed 
conflict. In some cases, as in the DRC, Liberia and Sierra Leone, ex-combatant youth 
have no memory of peaceful times or a “normal” civilian life. To respond, IDDRS 
suggests that DDR programmes should include: conflict management and inter-
personal skills training; as well as processes that target youth sensitiveness to 
authority and intergenerational conflicts. Access to counselling, education and 
training, including apprenticeship programmes should also be provided. According to 
the IDDRS, creating youth-specific labour-intensive physical and social infrastructure 
projects can also facilitate the reintegration of youth. 
 
Similarly, IDDRS also addresses the issues of children (those under 15). 77 Again, in 
many DDR situations children have been recruited as soldiers, or are engaged in 
assisting armed forces with various tasks, or are part of the wider network of family 
members of combatants. IDDRS points out that their needs (and therefore programme 
designs) are very different from those of adults, and they should be part of a separate 
DDR process that can attend to their needs, supported by specialised child support and 
protection agencies.  
 
A further group that has not always been properly addressed in DDR programmes is 
combatants and civilians who have crossed national borders into neighbouring 
territories. 78  Conflicts have often involved these spillovers of combatants and 
associated civilians across state borders, but DDR programmes have not always 
responded with the appropriate regional approach to tackle the problem. IDDRS drew 
up some specific recommendations, to permit demobilisation in host countries, and 
particularly stressed the need for close co-ordination and links between/among all 
DDR programmes in a region, including regular co-ordination meetings on DDR 
issues. 
6.7 The implementation and impact of the IDDRS 
The IDDRS has only been publicly available since late-2006, and as a result, there has 
been a limited time period for its rollout and implementation. However, two national 
DDR processes, namely Haiti and Sudan, were officially declared pilot processes for 
implementing (as well as determining the effectiveness of) the IDDRS. Initial 
indications suggest that implementation of integrated DDR approaches in line with 
the IDDRS framework has been extremely difficult, and that several case-studies 
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suggest a short fall in meeting the high expectations engendered by the IDDRS 
process. A critical overview of the Sudanese process is provided below. In addition, 
an assessment of the IDDRS in relation current developments in Nepal is also 
provided. 
 
It is important to note that the IDDRS is the culmination of more than a decade of 
implementation insights from the UN, as well as other, DDR programmes. For 
example, the DDR processes in East Timor, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the MDRP 
DDR programmes (all of which have a link with the UN) employed some of the 
principles and recommendations of the IDDRS. Thus it is difficult to isolate IDDRS 
as an isolated influence on programme design and implementation, but certainly Haiti 
and Sudan are still viewed by the UN as key pilot projects for IDDRS 
implementation.  
 
The IDDRS had a significant impact on the Sudan programme design, and Sudan was 
selected as a pilot for implementing the IDDRS. In terms of policy, the Sudanese 
Interim DDR Programme (IDDRP) clearly reflects IDDRS principles, and has a key 
focus on integrated programming (design, implementation and support) between the 
UN agencies (as well as other relevant international agencies). An integrated UN 
DDR Unit was established in Sudan, in which UNDP and the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) staff sought to work together under a single 
management structure. In addition, the DDR process in Sudan has an explicit human 
security focus. 
 
Despite the positive rhetoric at the beginning of the process, the DDR programme in 
Sudan has been much more complex and challenging than the programme designers 
had expected. It is being implemented in the context of a fragile North-South peace 
agreement and conflicts in Darfur and other parts of the country, and there is only 
limited commitment to the process by the key parties. These external problems would 
have posed serious challenges to any DDR programme, but other factors in 
programme design are also arguably responsible for the failure to implement 
effectively an integrated DDR package.  
 
Research conducted within this project concluded that there was a substantial gap 
between the principles contained in the IDDRP and what has been implemented in 
Sudan, and pointed to four factors that can be seen as responsible.  
 
• The fragility and weakness of the peace agreement as a basis for peace in 
Sudan, and specifically as a framing document for DDR. 
 
• The inability to translate the IDDRS principles into practice and, in particular, 
the failure of ‘integrated’ UN management of DDR. 
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• The breakdown in international political engagement and cooperation on the 
peace agreement and the security sector. 
 
• Unrealistic expectations of what DDR programming could achieve and weak 
capacity to deliver.79  
 
Internal divisions and institutional rivalries between UN agencies, and between 
centres of power in Khartoum, Juba, Geneva and New York have at times undermined 
the UN DDR Unit. In particular, one analyst claims that “tensions emerged between 
DPKO and UNDP over the best way forward”, with DPKO taking a more traditional 
top-down approach, while UNDP advocated a more community-based model.80 
 
These internal disputes have damaged the UN integrated mission’s performance and 
delayed programming in a number of key areas. Researchers suggest that greater 
‘integration’ has not yet translated into more effective and efficient DDR and 
improved capacity in national DDR institutions. Where there has been effective 
cooperation between the various institutional components of the DDR process in 
Sudan,  it seems to have  been based on the proactive and problem-solving approach 
of key individuals and the quality of management rather than institutional 
arrangements.81 
 
There have been similar doubts expressed over the integrated approach to DDR in 
Haiti82, but as in Sudan, it is not clear how much institutional cleavages have been 
significant factors, and how much the programme was simply poorly designed to deal 
with the complex situation inside Haiti. Clearly, both pilot projects have faced 
significant challenges in implementing the integrated approach demanded by IDDRS, 
but both pilot projects faced serious problems that any institutional design would have 
found difficult to overcome. It is still too early to definitively conclude whether the 
IDDRS approach to institutional design is productive, but it is clear that the IDDRS 
process has highlighted a number of key issues and challenges.  
6.8 Emerging challenges 
The rollout of the IDDRS process, as with many  DDR programmes, is encountering 
(and will continue to encounter in the foreseeable future) a variety of implementation 
challenges and obstacles. Four themes in this regard are outlined below. 
6.8.1  Disarmament, cantonment, demobilisation 
The efficiency and effectiveness of disarming, cantoning and demobilising ex-
combatants is fundamental to the success of any DDR process. UN agencies typically 
                                                 
79 Henry Smith. 2008. “Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in Sudan”, DDR and Human 
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face logistical and infrastructural challenges in many post-conflict environments in 
terms of providing for the disarmament, cantonment and demobilising ex-combatants. 
Often the UN is required to establish such programmes when the UN mission is in the 
initial start-up phase when the required logistical, human and material resources are 
yet to be acquired. Some locations may in fact be inaccessible. In such circumstances 
the UN, related agencies and the relevant government authority may, out of necessity, 
implement sub-standard disarmament, cantonment and demobilisation measures. In 
such cases, ex-combatants may not be effectively disarmed, housed, fed and clothed. 
In addition, ex-combatants may have to spend considerable periods of time in 
cantonment areas with little or no productive activities to keep them occupied.  
 
This state of affairs may result in conflict, protests and violence within the 
cantonment areas. Ex-combatants may, out of frustration or desperation, abscond with 
their weapons, and possibly engage in banditry activities, or re-ignite the armed 
conflict. Hence, it is essential for the appropriate UN agencies to have acquired the 
requisite resources and logistical arrangements prior to engaging in disarmament, 
cantonment and demobilisation exercises.  
6.8.2  Reinsertion and reintegration planning 
Successful reinsertion and reintegration is dependent on the quality of planning. 
However, effective planning cannot be undertaken in the absence of accurate 
information. Information on the following is critical to the success of planning: socio-
economic characteristics and career aspirations of the ex-combatants; employment 
data and a market analysis; as well as the government’s development and security 
sector reform strategies. 
 
Nevertheless, in many countries where IDDRS-related processes are being pursued, 
the information is question is unavailable or difficult to acquire. The generation of this 
information is a time-consuming process, and often the architects of DDR processes 
are under considerable political pressure to implement such processes, and do not 
have the resources nor the time to gather this information. 
6.8.3  Long-term reintegration 
As with the majority of DDR programmes, the reintegration component is the most 
complex and challenging. The reason being, as previously indicated, effective 
reintegration is a long-term process (that can take decades), and historically most 
DDR programmes are typically designed to be implemented over a period not 
exceeding five years. This is an acute problem for the UN and its related agencies, as 
UN bodies can only effectively implement DDR programmes in the context of a UN 
mission, which in most cases is a transitional arrangement. Reintegration support is 
often required long after the UN has concluded its mission. 
 
The UN is often required to implement reintegration processes in environments that 
are not conducive to success. The economy is often depressed or heavily constrained 
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by the damage caused by years of armed conflict, and the presence of the state and/or 
the UN mission in a number of rural areas is often absent. The result is that 
opportunities for employment and sustainable livelihoods are severely limited. In 
addition, some DDR programmes are implemented in environments characterised by 
episodes of violent conflict. 
 
In Liberia, for example, the DDR process was initiated in December 2003. However, 
these programmes were implemented in a territory that had been severely disrupted by 
civil war, and characterised by an economy that was fragile and constrained. 
Reintegration support in the form of vocation training and education programmes 
were provided. Nonetheless, the unsophisticated nature of the economy, and the lack 
of government and/or UN presence in many rural parts of Liberia, meant that large 
numbers of ex-combatants pursued income-generating activities in the informal and 
illegal sector, such as rubber tapping, diamond and gold mining, motorcycle taxis and 
pit-sawing. The UN continues to provide targeted reintegration support, although the 
UN is incrementally drawing down its presence within this country, and it is 
anticipated by 2010 that a substantial component of the UN Mission in Liberia 
(UNMIL) personnel will be withdrawn. 
6.8.4  Individual versus community reintegration 
Previously implemented reintegration processes have tended to focus almost 
exclusively on providing support to individual ex-combatants. The key assumption of 
this type of programming was that by providing ex-combatants with skills and 
resources, these individuals would reintegrate into civilian life on their own terms. 
However, to date, the long-term results of this approach have been mediocre at best.  
 
Projects that target the potential reception communities (of substantial populations of 
ex-combatants) have been a minority pursuit within the DDR sector, and in particular, 
are not a significant feature of the IDDRS. According to the empirical research that 
currently exists, significant numbers of ex-combatants in developing countries have 
experienced difficulties integrating in both urban and rural settings. Given this state of 
affairs, DDR programmers should consider giving more priority to community-based 
projects that provide incentives for communities to embrace the reintegration 
processes. 
 
6.9 The way forward for the IDDRS 
Despite the setbacks in the DDR process in Sudan, the problems encountered in Haiti 
and the inconsistent application of the IDDRS principles in Central Africa, it seems 
highly likely that the IDDRS will become increasingly influential with respect to the 
design and implementation of DDR processes (particularly where there is a UN 
presence) over the next five years. The reason for this is that there appears to be 
considerable political will and momentum behind the implementation of the IDDRS, 
both within the UN system and the international donor community. 
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The IDDRS presents a coherent standards and measures for the proactive pursuance 
of the DDR dynamic, as it was developed with “best practice” in mind. However, the 
challenge is in the implementation and co-ordination of activities. Also, in order for 
the IDDRS to have a more constructive impact on sustainable peace, poverty 
alleviation and human security, one of the key tensions within the IDDRS should be 
urgently addressed. That is, nationally-led processes may actively seek to not adhere 
to the other principles and recommendations of the IDDRS.  
Conclusion 
 
The initiatives, processes and programmes that have been explored in this paper 
indicate that over the past few years there has been a noticeable intellectual shift 
within the DDR community towards taking cognisance of the linkages between DDR 
and the related phenomena of poverty alleviation and human security. This is 
particularly evident in terms of the conception of DDR approaches and programming, 
as with the SIDDR and IDDRS. 
 
Nevertheless, the extent to which this intellectualising has been converted into action 
is yet to be effectively realised. The MDRP is a case in point. There is evidence to 
suggest that the MDRP personnel are aware that in order for the DDR processes to be 
sustainable, they need to be geared towards enhancing poverty alleviation and human 
security of the broader community. However, the sizeable nature of the Programme, 
its technocratic approach, as well as the fact that the MDRP in the latter part of the 
implementation stage, has meant that it has been very difficult to make the necessary 
adjustments. 
 
The effective implementation of the IDDRS faces similar challenges. Clearly, more 
integrated DDR processes will benefit the poor, as well as enhance sustainable peace 
and human security. Nonetheless, significant institutional reforms and changes in 
organisational cultures and practices are required before such progress can take place. 
 
In general, in order for the more holistic thinking on DDR to be incorporated into 
DDR programming, it is imperative that significant resources, greater long-term and 
meticulous planning (based on accurate intelligence), as well as consultation with 
national governments and affected communities takes place. 
 
